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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

DAVID L. MILLS,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 940324-CA

Priority No. 2

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from convictions for attempted riot,
a class A misdemeanor, under Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-9-101(1) & (3),
76-2-202 and 76-4-102(4) (1994) and attempted injury to a jail, a
class A misdemeanor, under Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-8-418, 76-2-202,
76-4-102(4) (1994).
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1994).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court comply with the requirements of

rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure in accepting
defendant's guilty pleas?
Defendant affirmatively declined to specify any
particular rule 11 challenge to his guilty pleas in moving to
withdraw the pleas below, nor has he argued exceptional
circumstances or plain error on appeal. Accordingly, defendant's
allegation of a rule 11 violation is waived, State v. Jennings.

875 P.2d 566, 570 (Utah App. 1994).

See also State v. Gibbons.

740 P.2d 1309, 1311 (Utah 1987).
2.

Did the trial court properly determine that

defendant entered his guilty pleas voluntarily?
A guilty plea "'may be withdrawn only upon good cause
shown and with leave of the [trial] court.'11

State v. Thorup.

841 P.2d 746, 747 (Utah App. 1992) (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 7713-6(2) (a) (1990)), cert, denied, 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993).

"A

'withdrawal of plea of guilty is a privilege, not a right . . .
[and] is within the sound discretion of the trial court.'"

Id.

(quoting State v. Gallecros, 738 P.2d 1040, 1041 (Utah 1987)).
"On appeal the trial court's denial of a motion to set aside a
guilty plea will not be disturbed 'unless it clearly appears that
the trial court abused its discretion.'"

Id. (quoting State v.

Truiillo-Martinez, 814 P.2d 596, 599 (Utah App. 1991), cert,
denied, 843 P.2d 516 (Utah 1992)).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Utah R. Crim. Pro. 11 (e) (attached as Addendum D ) .
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with riot, a third degree felony,
in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-9-101(1) & (3) and 76-2-202
(1994), and injury to a jail, a third degree felony, in violation
of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-8-418 and 76-2-202 (1994) (R. 82-84) .
Pursuant to a package plea bargain agreement, defendant
and two codefendants plead to reduced charges:

2

Defendant pled

guilty to attempted riot, a class A misdemeanor, and to attempted
injury to a jail, also a class A misdemeanor (R. 194-97).
The trial court sentenced defendant to two concurrent
one year terms (R. 210).
Defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty pleas
on the ground that they were not voluntary (R. 215-16) (copies of
defendant's motion, affidavit, and memorandum are attached as
Addendum A).

Following an evidentiary hearing on the matter, the

trial court denied defendant's motion (R. 233-34) (a copy of the
order is attached as Addendum C).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1
On August 9, 1993, five inmates, including defendant,
at the Central Utah Correctional Facility (CUCF) refused a "rack
in" order and started a riot (R. 4, 6). The inmates breached the
secure section door to Cedar, Section I, and entered into the
sallyport area around the control room (R. 4 ) . Defendant
participated in the riot by breaking out several cell door
windows (R. 6). Total damage to the facility amounted to over
$36,000 (R. 4)•
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I
This Court should not consider defendant's challenge to
the trial court's compliance with rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure, for the first time on direct appeal.
1

Defendant has

As defendant's convictions resulted from his pleas of
guilty rather than a trial on the merits, the facts are gleaned
from the probable cause affidavit (R. 4-6).
3

not articulated a plain error, nor any other exceptional
circumstance that would excuse his affirmative waiver of the
issue in his opening brief.

Accordingly, defendant's remedy, if

any, must now be pursued under rule 65(B), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
POINT II
Although defendant did raise a voluntariness challenge
to his guilty pleas below, he failed to substantiate his
allegations of coercion at the plea withdrawal hearing.

Indeed,

defendant admitted that neither of his codefendants ever
threatened him to accept the package plea agreement.
Accordingly, defendant's claims of coercion on appeal are
unsupported by the record and fail to demonstrate that the trial
court abused its discretion in refusing to allow withdrawal of
the pleas.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANT AFFIRMATIVELY DECLINED TO SPECIFY
ANY RULE 11 CHALLENGE TO HIS GUILTY PLEAS
BELOW AND HAS FAILED TO ARTICULATE A PLAIN
ERROR OR EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCE EXCUSING
HIS WAIVER IN HIS OPENING BRIEF; ACCORDINGLY,
DEFENDANT'S RULE 11 CHALLENGE HAS NOT BEEN
PRESERVED FOR REVIEW ON DIRECT APPEAL
"[0]rdinarily, [the reviewing court] will not entertain
an issue first raised on appeal in the absence of exceptional
circumstances or plain error."

State v. Gibbons. 740 P.2d 1309,

1311 (Utah 1987); State v. Price, 837 P.2d 578, 580-81 (Utah App.
1992).

The waiver rule applies to constitutional issues as well.
4

State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 922 (Utah App. 1991).

The

reasoning behind the waiver rule was stated by this Court in
State v. Brown;
The purpose of requiring a properly presented
objection is to *put[] the judge on notice of
the asserted error and allow[] the
opportunity for correction at that time in
the course of the proceeding.' The trial
court is considered 'the proper forum in
which to commence thoughtful and probing
analysis' of issues. Failing to argue an
issue and present pertinent evidence in that
forum denies the trial court %the opportunity
to make any findings of fact or conclusions
of law' pertinent to the claimed error.
856 P.2d 358, 359-60 (Utah App. 1993) (citations omitted).
In the trial court defendant moved to withdraw his
guilty pleas on the sole ground that his "pleas were not
voluntary[,] but were entered to avoid retaliation from his [c]o[d]efendants" (R. 215-16), see Addendum A.
On appeal, defendant raises the additional argument
that his pleas were taken in violation of rule 11, Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure, claiming that the record fails to indicate
that he waived his constitutional right against selfincrimination, or that he understood the nature and elements of
the offenses to which he pled.

Br. of App. at 26. However,

defendant has not alleged plain error or any exceptional
circumstance that would excuse the obvious waiver of his rule 11
challenge.

State v. Jennings, 875 P.2d 566, 570 (Utah App. 1994)

(declining to address rule 11 challenge on appeal because
defendant "failed" to raise the issue below and "[did] not assert
either exceptional circumstances or plain error on appeal").
5

See

also State v. Sepulveda, 842 P.2d 913, 917-18 & n.5. (Utah App.
1992) (declining to review a scope of detention challenge first
raised on appeal and about which the defendant neither argued
exceptional circumstances nor plain error); cf. State v. Brown,
853 P.2d 851, 853-54 (Utah 1992) (disavowing the "liberty
interest" where used for the purpose of carving out an additional
exception to the traditional plain error standard).
Rather, the "Standard of Review" portion of defendant's
brief refers generally to State v. Pharris, 798 P.2d 772, 774
(Utah App.), cert, denied, 804 P.2d 1232 (Utah 1990), and State
v. Valencia, 776 P.2d 1332, 1334 (Utah App. 1989), for the broad
proposition that the Court will consider a rule 11 challenge for
the first time on appeal.

Br. of App. at 3.

While Pharris and

Valencia are less than clear concerning an appellant's burden to
assert plain error or exceptional circumstances to excuse waiver,
the Court's later Jennings decision is clear as to those
requirements and is also consistent with the Utah's well
established wavier rule.

875 P.2d at 570.

See also Gibbons, 740

P.2d at 1311 (where defendant had not yet moved to withdraw
guilty plea, supreme court remanded for that purpose, recognizing
that disposition was "consonant" with its "policy of allowing
trial judges to have the opportunity to address an alleged error"
(citing State v. Lesley, 672 P.2d 79, 82 (Utah 1983)).

The Court

should refuse to consider the trial court's rule 11 compliance
for the first time on direct appeal.

6

Further, the record does not support an inference that
there was any reason unknown or unavailable to defendant that
would have prevented him from raising these rule 11 challenges at
the plea withdrawal hearing.

To the contrary, defense counsel

affirmatively declined to specify any particular rule 11
challenge:
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: One other item, Your
Honor. At this time we do not wish to
address a strict compliance requirements
[sic] with the Rule 1 1 M UTAH RULES OF
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE. However, we would like
to reserve that procedure, if this ruling is
is [sic] adverse to us today.
THE COURT: Adverse what issue? Tell me what
you're talking about. Get specific. You
claim I didn't comply with Rule 11?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I don't want to claim
that right now, but I would like to reserve
that, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Well, you were present. Didn't I
ask you at one time if there was any reason
why I should not sentence them?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:

Yes, you did, Your Honor.

THE COURT:
You told me there was no reason;
isn't that what you told me?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:
THE COURT:
that.

Yes, I believe I did.

Now you don't want to be bound by

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:
bound by whether--

No.

I don't want to be

THE COURT: All right. Anything else?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: No.

7

(Transcript of withdrawal hearing, May 4, 1994, PWTr. 16-17) (a
copy of the complete transcript is attached as Addendum B). 3
In light of the above exchange, this is not a case, or
a circumstance, where the Court should depart from Utah's well
established waiver policy.

See Jennings, 875 P.2d at 570;

Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1311. The Court's recent affirmation of the
waiver rule's applicability to rule 11 challenges in Jennings,
casts considerable doubt on the precedential weight, if any, to
be accorded Pharris and Valencia.

Moreover, to consider

defendant's rule 11 challenge for the first time on appeal, would
be to reward defense counsel's4 misuse of Utah's judicial
resources.

Indeed, had the issue been timely raised and argued

to the trial court, it is not clear that the trial court would
have found rule 11 compliance at the time the guilty plea was
entered.

See (Transcript of Jury Trial, March 21, 1994, JTr. at

28-36) . Thus, defendant may well have been afforded the
opportunity to withdraw his guilty pleas at the plea withdrawal
hearing.

By expressly reserving the argument below, defense

counsel essentially by-passed a critical stage of the judicial
process and jumped straight to this Court for a first time airing
of his rule 11 allegations.
condoned.

Such wasteful strategy should not be

Accordingly, because defendant failed to raise the

3

Notwithstanding defense counsel's express reservation
of the issue, in its Order refusing to allow withdrawal, the
trial court found that it had in fact complied with rule 11 in
accepting defendant's pleas (R. 234), see Addendum C.
4

Defendant's appellate counsel also represented him at
the plea taking, and plea withdrawal proceedings below (R. 23).
8

issue below and asserts neither plain error, nor an exceptional
circumstance argument on appeal, this Court should not reach this
issue.

Defendant's remedy, if any, now lies in a post-conviction

writ under rule 65(B), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
POINT II
DEFENDANT DID NOT SHOW GOOD CAUSE, NOR DID
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
REFUSING TO ALLOW WITHDRAWAL OF DEFENDANT'S
GUILTY PLEAS
As noted above, defendant moved to withdraw his guilty
pleas on the sole ground that they were involuntary (R. 215-16),
see Addendum A.

Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial

court denied defendant's motion, finding that defendant had
failed to demonstrate "good cause" for withdrawal (R. 234), see
Addendum C.

Defendant's claims of coercion on appeal are

unsubstantiated and fail to demonstrate that the trial court
abused its discretion in so ruling.

State v. Thorup, 841 P.2d

746, 747 (Utah App. 1992), cert, denied, 853 P.2d 897 (Utah
1993) .
A. Failure to Substantiate Claims of
Coercion
Defendant's motion to withdraw claimed that he
involuntarily pled guilty because he wanted to "avoid retaliation
from his [c]o-defendants" with whom he had been offered a
"package" plea agreement (R. 215-16), see Addendum A.

The

package plea agreement required that all codefendant's plead
guilty to reduced charges, or, alternatively, that all
codefendants go to trial.

Id.

Defendant's accompanying
9

affidavit alleged that he felt under "extreme pressure" to accept
the agreement and that " [i]f he had not accepted the plea
bargain, [he] could

have been exposed to physical and emotional

retaliation from one of [his] [c]o-defendants" (R. 217-18), see
Addendum A (emphasis added).
At the evidentiary hearing, defendant claimed that he
was initially unwilling to accept the package plea agreement, but
that he later acquiesced because he did not feel he would get a
fair trial (PWTr. 6), see Addendum B.

Defendant was concerned

that the jury would be biased against him (PWTr. 6), see Addendum
B.

He also did not want to be tried with his codefendants (PWTr.

6-7), see Addendum B.5

Defendant then alleged that he felt

pressure from the "court attorney" and codefendants to accept the
package deal (PWTr. 6), see Addendum B.

However, defendant

admitted that he did not tell the trial court that his pleas were
involuntary:
We [defendant and codefendants] were all
sitting right there [in court]. Everybody
was just like it is right how. I mean if I
would have said that, it would have been just
the same as me saying no anyway.
(PWTr. 8), see Addendum B.

5

The trial court denied defendant's motion to sever his
trial from that of codefendants following the preliminary hearing
(Transcript of preliminary hearing, January 5, 1994, PHTr. at 9091). To the extent defendant is asserting that the trial court's
denial of his severance motion somehow rendered his subsequent
guilty pleas involuntary, see Br. of App. at 32-33, it is waived
for failure to allege this below. Jennings. 875 P.2d at 570.
Defendant has not articulated a plain error or other exceptional
circumstance excusing the waiver. Id.
10

On cross-examination, defendant reiterated that he had
not informed the trial court, or defense counsel, that he had
been threatened, or that he feared retaliation if he refused to
accept the package plea agreement (PWTr. 9-10), see Addendum B.
More importantly, defendant admitted that neither codefendant had
ever threatened him to go along with the plea agreement (PWTr.
10), see Addendum B.
On redirect, defendant claimed that his feelings of
coercion derived from an "unsaid thing.

You just--just you know.

You just know" (PWTr. 10), see Addendum B.

Defendant again

acknowledged that he had never been threatened by his
codefendants (PWTr. 11), see Addendum B.
Codefendant Jeffery Eaton's testimony added nothing to
defendant's claims of coercion.

Eaton acknowledged that he felt

it was in his best interest to accept the plea agreement, and
that he knew he would not be able to do so if the agreement was
rejected by his codefendants (PWTr. 12), see Addendum B.

Eaton

denied however, that he had ever threatened defendant with bodily
injury or any other type of retaliation if defendant did not
accept the package deal (PWTr. 12), see Addendum B.
Codefendant Michael Land similarly testified.

Like

Eaton, Land believed the plea agreement was in his best
interests, particularly after considering the potential jury
roster (PWTr. 14), see Addendum B.

Land also denied having ever

threatening defendant (PWTr. 15), see Addendum B.

11

Defense counsel made no argument elaborating on
defendant's allegations of coercion.

Rather, as previously

noted, defense counsel merely indicated his intention to reserve
any rule 11 challenge to the validity of the pleas until after
the court had ruled on the voluntariness issue (PWTr. 16-17), see
Addendum B.
Based on the above, the trial court denied defendant's
request to withdraw his guilty pleas, finding "that there were
not any threats made to the [d]efendant from co-defendants [sic]
in this case in order to obtain his plea" (R. 234), see Addendum
C.
Notwithstanding, on appeal to this Court, defendant
argues that his pleas were involuntarily entered as a consequence
of the package deal nature of the plea agreement.
29-36.

Br. of App. at

In so arguing, defendant places primary reliance on

United States v. Caro, 997 F.2d 657 (9th Cir. 1993).

In Caro,

the government offered a package plea agreement to four
codefendants.

Caro subsequently sought to withdraw his plea on

the ground that his codefendants had pressured him to agree.
at 659.

The trial court denied Caro's motion without benefit

an evidentiary

hearing

on the matter.

Id.

Id.
of

This fact

distinguishes Caro from the instant facts and undermines
defendant's reliance thereon.
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit determined that the prosecutor's description of the
plea agreement in the trial court had been so ambiguous that it
12

was impossible to determine whether the trial court was alerted
to the package nature of the deal.

Caro, 997 F.2d at 659.

Recognizing that a package deal plea agreement is not per se
impermissible, the Ninth Circuit clarified its view that a trial
court should make a more careful voluntariness inquiry under that
circumstance.

997 F.2d at 659. Accord State v. Danh, 516 N.W.2d

539 (Minn. 1994); State v. Solano, 724 P.2d 17, 21 (Ariz. 1986).
Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit remanded the case for an
evidentiary hearing on Caro's motion to withdraw his plea,
directing the trial court to "find whether Caro entered his plea
because of threats or pressures from his codefendants."
at 660.

997 F.2d

See United States v. Wheat, 813 F.2d 1399, 1405 (9th

Cir. 1987) ("The voluntariness test adequately protects the
criminal defendant's due process rights, while at the same time
preserving the benefits of the plea bargaining process."), aff'd.
486 U.S. 153 (1988).
Defendant complains that the trial court in this case
was similarly uninformed as to the package nature of the plea
agreement and therefore failed to properly determine the
voluntariness of his individual plea.

Br. of App. at 35.

Regardless of whether the trial court was aware of the package
nature of the deal when defendant initially pled, defendant was
afforded a subsequent opportunity to argue the alleged coercive
nature of the package plea agreement at the plea withdrawal
hearing.

Thus defendant has already been afforded the benefit of

the recommended relief in Caro: A full evidentiary hearing
13

concerning the alleged coercion of codefendants.6

As detailed

above, defendant was unable to substantiate his claims of
coercion at that hearing.

The trial court properly refused to

allow withdrawal of the pleas on that ground.

See Castello, 724

F.2d at 815 (no abuse of discretion in refusal to allow plea
withdrawal following hearing on the matter where defendant failed
to establish clear error in trial court's finding that "there
were no threats or promises made to defendant at the time she
entered her plea").
Defendant's remaining claims of involuntariness on
appeal are unsubstantiated and/or inconsequential and similarly
fail to demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion in
refusing to allow withdrawal.

For example, defendant's claims

that he "never did wish to accept any of the plea bargains
offered," and that he believed "he stood to gain little by
pleading guilty," contradict his testimony at the withdrawal

6

The United States Supreme Court has reserved judgment
on "the constitutional implications of a prosecutor's offer
during plea bargaining of adverse or lenient treatment for some
person other than the accused. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434
U.S. 357, 364 n.8 (1978). However, federal circuit court's
addressing the issue have concluded that third party threats or
promises are not coercive per se; " [r]ather they have held that
the trial court should make a more careful examination of the
voluntariness of a plea when it is induced by such threats or
promises." United States v. Castello, 724 F.2d 813 (9th Cir.)
(collecting cases), cert, denied, 467 U.S. 1254 (1984). Caro
demonstrates that even where the trial court allegedly fails to
adequately determine the voluntariness of pleas entered pursuant
to a package agreement, the situation can be remedied at a
subsequent evidentiary hearing on the matter. 997 F.2d at 660
(holding that, if, after remand, "the district court find's
Caro's assertions of codefendant pressure baseless, the error at
the Rule 11 stage will be rendered harmless").
14

hearing.

Compare Br. of App. at 32 and (PWTi

Addendum B.

6-7, 10), see

As for defendant's claim that he had good reason to

fear codefendants, it is inconsistent with his testimony that
neither codefendant ever threatened him.

Compare Br. of App. at

34 and (PWTr. 10-11), see Addendum B.
Defendant has similarly overstated the testimony of
codefendant's Eaton and Land.

While defendant claims both

codefendants believed they would receive earlier parole dates by
accepting the plea agreement, codefendants merely indicated that
they thought the plea agreement was in their best interest, and
did not specify a reason (PWTr. 12, 15), see Addendum B.
Defendant further claims that codefendants and their trial
counsel told him that he could not receive a fair trial because
the jury would be biased against him.

Br. of App. at 33. Only

defendant's self-serving testimony supports his assertion.
Neither Eaton or Land so testified and their trial counsel was
not called as a witness at the withdrawal hearing.

Even assuming

defendant is correct as to Eaton and Land's reasoning and advice,
he has not demonstrated that it had an unfairly coercive effect
on his individual decision to accept the plea agreement,
particularly where defendant admits that neither codefendant ever
threatened him to accept the package deal (PWTr. 10-11), see
Addendum B.
B.

Failure to Marshal

Defendant's attempts to cast the evidence in a more
favorable light suggests that he is really challenging the
15

factual basis in support of the trial court's refusal to allow
withdrawal of the pleas and it's implicit determination of
voluntariness.

However, an appellant must first marshal the

evidence in the light most favorable to the trial
and then demonstrate that it is insufficient.

court's

ruling,

State v. Larsen,

828 P.2d 487, 491 (Utah App. 1992) ("Our insistence on compliance
with the marshaling requirement is not a case of exalting
hypertechnical adherence to form over substance.

'A reviewing

court is entitled to have the issues clearly defined with
pertinent authority cited and is not simply a depository in which
the appealing party may dump the burden of argument and
research.7

(citation omitted)), aff'd. 865 P.2d 1355 (Utah 1993).

See also State v. Drobel, 815 P.2d 724, 734 (Utah App. 1991),
cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1991?); State v. Moosman. 794
P.2d 474, 475-76 (Utah 1990) . Based on the analysis in Parts AB, supra, defendant has failed to comply with this strict
requirement.

He has thus failed to demonstrate any clear error

in the trial court's implicit voluntariness finding.

Drobel, 815

P.2d at 735.
In sum, the record of the plea withdrawal hearing is
devoid of indication that defendant was threatened or otherwise
unlawfully coerced into accepting the package plea agreement.
Indeed, defendant admitted that he decided to accept the plea
agreement due to his concern about juror bias, particularly where
he was to be tried with codefendants.

He further denied ever

having been threatened by codefendants and failed to substantiate
16

coercion from any other source.

Defendant's alleged internal

feelings of coercion do not constitute good cause for withdrawal.
This Court should affirm the trial court's ruling.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court should determine that
defendant affirmatively waived his allegation of a rule 11
violation.

The Court should further determine that defendant's

claims of involuntariness are unsubstantiated and thus the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow
withdrawal of the pleas.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this L y day of February, 1995.
JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

rakUtf
1IAN DECKER
Assistant Attorney General
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of
the foregoing Brief of Appellee were mailed, postage prepaid, to
JEFFERY P. GLEAVE, attorney for appellant, 195 North 100 East,
#205, Richfield, Utah

84701, this f .fflaay of February, 1995.
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

JEFFERY P. GLEAVE (6390)
HUNT & GLEAVE
Attorney for Defendant
195 North 100 East, Suite 205
Richfield, Utah 84701
(801) 896-4424
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IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SANPETE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

vs.
PHILLIP J. BOLIN, MICHAEL A.
BRADLEY, JEFFREY C. EATON,
MICHAEL A. LAND, and DAVID L.
MILLS,
Defendants.

:

MOTION TO WITHDRAW

:

GUILTY PLEAS

:*
:
:
:
:
:

Case No. 931600154
JUDGE DON V. TIBBS

The Defendant, David L. Mills, by and through his attorney,
Jeffery P. Gleave, hereby moves the above-entitled court for an
Order permitting the Defendant to withdraw the pleas of guilty to
Attempted Riot a class A misdemeanor and Attempt to Injure a Jail
a Class A misdemeanor. These pleas were entered on March 21,
1994 and therefore motion is timely since the thirty (30) days
permitted by U.C.A. 77-13-6 have not expired.
As a basis for this Motion, it is the Defendant's position
that good cause exists to permit withdrawal of his guilty pleas.
He alleges that his pleas were not voluntary but were entered to
avoid retaliation from his Co-Defendants in this case.
Specifically, there were three Co-Defendants remaining on March
21, 1994 who had not previously plead guilty. The Sanpete County

<3»S

State v. Bolin, et al.,
Motion to Withdraw Guilty Pleas
Page 2
Attorney offered to reduce the criminal charges facing these
remaining Co-Defendants in a return for guilty pleas.
The offers were conveyed to the Co-Defendants but not all
were willing to accept the offered agreement. Subsequently, the
Sanpete County Attorney placed a restriction on the offer that if
all of the Co-Defendants did not accept the offer, then none of
them would be permitted to accept it individually.
The Defendant felt that because of the restriction placed on
the offered agreement, if he had elected not to accept, then he
would have been subjected to physical and emotional retaliation
from the Co-Defendants, since they would not have been permitted
to accept the plea bargain without his concurrence. (The
Defendant executed an affidavit consistent with these statements
and is attached as Exhibit A) •
WHEREFORE, the Defendant requests that the Motion to
Withdraw Guilty Pleas be granted and permit the Defendant to be
tried by a jury for the offenses charged against him.
DATED this l/* day of April, 1994.

fMFmY P. GLEAVE
Akttoxney for Defendant
^DSvid L. Mills

JEFFERY P. GLEAVE (6390)
HUNT & GLEAVE
Attorney for Defendant
195 North 100 East, Suite 205
Richfield, Utah 84701
(801) 896-4424

IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SANPETE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

:
Plaintiff,

vs.
PHILLIP J. BOLIN, MICHAEL A.
BRADLEY, JEFFREY C. EATON,
MICHAEL A. LAND, and DAVID L.
MILLS,
Defendant.

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SANPETE

)
)
)

!
:
:

AFFIDAVIT OF
DAVID L. MILLS

:
:
:

Case No. 931600154

:

JUDGE DON V. TIBBS

ss.

David L. Mills, after being duly sworn, states the
following:
1)

I an one of the Defendants in the above-entitled

matter.
2)

I involuntarily plead guilty to charges of Attempted

Riot and Attempt to Injure a Jail, on March 21, 1994.
3)

The reasons my pleas were involuntary are:
a.

The Codefendants were offered as a group a plea

bargain that by its terms, could only be accepted unanimously by
all of the Codefendants in this case; and
b.

I felt under extreme pressure from the County

state v. Bolin, et al.,
Affidavit of David L. Mills
Page 2
Attorney to accept this bargain since it was my understanding
that he would not permit me to go to trial on the charges alone;
and
c.
If I had not accepted the plea bargain, I could
have been exposed to physical and emotional retaliation from one
of my Codefendants who desired to accept the plea bargain.
DATED this /6*~day of April, 1994.

a£_^vk

David L. M i l l s
Affiant

•°JL^

FTERY P. GLEAVE
:orney for Defendant
195 North 100 East, Suite 205
Richfield, Utah 84701

1994.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this f/F— day of April,

/
Residing at: jdpfufst*,

My Commission Expires:

TfO^ARY PUBLIC
Ctr.<

/ '

^

&V-4~4D
NOTARY PUBUC
VAXtmCE

a

JEFFERY P. GLEAVE (6390)
HUNT & GLEAVE
Attorney for Defendant
195 North 100 East, Suite 205
Richfield, Utah 84701
(801) 896-4424

••' L -
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IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SANPETE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO WITHDRAW
GUILTY PLEAS

vs.
PHILLIP J. BOLIN, MICHAEL A.
BRADLEY, JEFFREY C. EATON,
MICHAEL A. LAND, and DAVID L.
MILLS,
Defendants.

Case No. 931600154
JUDGE DON V. TIBBS

The Defendant, David L. Mills, by and through his attorney,
Jeffery P. Gleave, hereby submits the following memorandum in
support of his Motion to Withdraw Guilty Pleas.
FACTS
The Defendant along with four Codefendants were charged in
an information with various criminal violations stemming from a
disturbance at Central Utah Correctional Facility. Prior to the
trial date, Phillip J. Bolin and Michael A. Bradley accepted plea
bargains from the Sanpete County Attorney. The remaining three
Codefendants did not accept the plea bargains which were offered
but prepared to undergo a jury trial to determine their guilt or
innocence.
On March 21, 1994, the day the scheduled trial was to begin,

State v. Bolin, et al.,
Memorandum in support of motion
Page 2
and after the jury venire was qualified, Judge Don V. Tibbs heard
argument in his chambers concerning a Motion for a Protective
Order filed by the Attorney General's Office of the State of
Utah, After ruling on this motion, the Sanpete County Attorney
offered a plea bargain that was substantially ffbetter,,than the
original offer to the Defendants David L. Mills, Michael A. Land,
and Jeffrey C. Eaton.
This offer was not accepted by Michael A Land or David L
Mills. Additional negotiations were undertaken by the
Defendant's attorneys and the Sanpete County Attorney. While I
(Jeffery P. Gleave) was discussing with the Defendant, David L.
Mills, the modifications Mr. Blackham had offered to him, Mr.
Douglas Neeley, the attorney for Defendants Eaton and Land
returned to the room and announced that Mr. Blackham had stated
that either all of the Defendants were required to accept the
offered plea bargain or none of them would be permitted to accept
it.
The Defendant Jeffrey C. Eaton was facing trial on
Possession of a Dangerous Weapon at a Correctional Facility, a
second degree felony and Riot, a third degree felony. He was
very desirous of accepting the plea bargain and pleading to two
amended Class A misdemeanor counts and kept "encouraging" Mills
and Land to accept the offered plea bargain.
Eventually, all the Defendants plead guilty to the counts in
the amended information on March 21, 1994.
aRGPiqsPT
A portion of the guarantees granted to all accused persons
in criminal prosecutions, by Article I Section 12 of the
Constitution of Utah, includes: the right to appear and defend

State v. Bolin, et al.,
Memorandum in support of motion
Page 3
in person and by counsel, to testify in his own defense and the
right to have a speedy trial by an impartial jury. It is well
understood that the defendant may waive these rights if certain
requirements are met. An important requirement that must be
satisfied is that the waiver must be voluntary.
To withdraw a guilty plea defendant must show good cause and
with leave of the court. U.C.A. 77-13-6(2)(a) (1953 as amended).
Good cause exists where the plea was entered involuntarily.
State v. Forsvth, 560 P.2d 337, 338 (Utah 1977). In Forsyth, the
Utah Supreme Court stated, "we are in full agreement with the
proposition that for a plea of guilty to be valid it must appear
that the accused had a clear understanding of the charge and
without undue influence, coercion, or improper inducement
voluntarily entered such plea.11 Id. at 338-39.
In the instant case, the Defendant was subjected to undue
influence and coercion by his Codefendants and the Sanpete County
Attorney because if he had stated he did not want to plead guilty
to the amended information, the other Codefendants who desired to
accept the "deal" would not have been allowed to do so.
In this case Defendant Mills, had made a Motion to Sever the
Defendants for purposes of trial. However, this Motion had been
denied and he was involuntarily placed in a position where he
would stand trial not alone but with several other Defendants
which he felt was not is his best interests. Furthermore, on
March 21, 1994, he was placed in position where he was required
to acquiesce in the offered bargain or suffer the consequences
from his fellow Codefendants.
Therefore, it seems apparent that by requiring the
Defendants to collectively accept the offered plea bargain and if

State v. Bolin, et al.,
Memorandum in support of motion
Page 3
not, prohibiting them from accepting it individually, that there
was coercion and undue influence exerted on Defendant Mills to
plead guilty to reduced charges. As stated in Forsyth, Id., good
cause exists to withdraw the plea if it was entered with either
undue influence or coercion which would render the plea
involuntary. Here it seems that both undue influence and
coercion are present which makes the voluntariness of the plea
doubly flawed.
DATED this j^_ day of April, 1994.

'FffiV P. GLEAVE
jorriey for Defendant
David L. M i l l s

^

- » -

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
MOTION TO WITHDRAW GUILTY PLEAS, MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO
WITHDRAW GUILTY PLEAS and AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID L. MILLS was hand
delivered to the following, this /£
day of April, 1994.
Ross C. Blackham
160 North Main
Manti, Utah 84642

\il. ^-Ly " i'*••r
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ADDENDUM B

ORIGINAL
1

IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF SANPETE, STATE OF UTAH

2
3
4

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

5
6

CASE NO. 931600154
WITHDRAWAL OF PLEA

VS.
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

7

DAVID L. MILLS,
Defendant.

8

9
10

BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 4th day of May 1994,

11

commencing at 10:00 a.m., that the above entitled matter

12

came on regularly before the Honorable DON V. TIBBS, Judge

13

of the Sixth Judicial District Court in and for the County

14

of Sanpete, State of Utah, at the Sanpete County Courthouse,

15

Manti, Utah;

16

That at the conclusion of the above entitled

17

proceedings JEFFREY P. GLEAVE, Counsel for defendant in the

18

above entitled action, requested a copy of the TRANSCRIPT OF

19

PROCEEDINGS and that TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS appears

20

herein as follows:

21
22
23
24
25

J. M. LIDDELL, CSR, RPR
SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT REPORTER
SANPETE COUNTY COURTHOUSE
MANTI, UTAH 84642

r«uc ^

APPEARANCES
For the Plaintiff:

ROSS C. BLACKHAM
SANPETE COUNTY ATTORNEY
Sanpete County Courthouse
160 North Main Street
Manti, UT 84642

For the Defendant:

JEFFERY P. GLEAVE
ATTORNEY AT LAW
195 North 100 East, #205
Richfield, UT 84701
—ooOoo—
INDEX
PAGE NO.

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
MOTION TO WITHDRAW PLEA
DEFENDANT'S WITNESSES
DAVID L. MILLS
Direct Examination by Mr. Gleave
Cross Examination bv Mr. Blackham
JEFFERY EATON
Direct Examination by Mr. Gleave
Cross Examination bv Mr. Blackham
MICHAEL LAND
Direct Examination by Mr. Gleave
Cross Examination bv Mr. Blackham
COURT ORDER AND FINDINGS
—ooOoo—

3
3

4
8
11, 13
12
13
15
17

PAGE 3
10:00 A.M.
4TH MAY 1994
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
THE COURT:

The next matter is 0154 the State

of Utah vs. David L. Mills, Mr. Blackham for the state of
Utah and Mr. Jeffery P. Gleave for the defendant.
The record should indicate the defendant, Mr.
Mills, is present, isn't he?
MR. GLEAVE: Yes.
THE COURT:

Mr. Mills is present, personally.

MOTION TO WITHDRAW PLEA
THE COURT:

The matter is before the Court on a

motion to withdraw plea.

I have—for the purpose of the

record, I have examined the plea, the memorandum filed in
connection with the case.

The record should also indicate

that I'm the Judge that took the pleas.
All right.
MR. GLEAVE:

I'll hear you.
Your Honor, we we're simply claiming

that Mr. Mills' plea u/as involuntarily to the charges u/hich
were relevant at the prison on August 9th.

We're prepared

to present testimony, if the Court feels is necessary.
THE COURT:
counsel.

It's not a matter of what I feel,

I assume you're trying to make a record.
MR. GLEAVE: Yes.
I believe it's the State's position that strict

compliance with Rule 11 of the UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL

PAGE 4
PROCEDURE were followed in that the Court found that the
Plea u/as in fact, voluntary.

At this time, Your Honor, I

would like to call David Mills.
DEFENDANT'S WITNESSES

THE COURT:

All right.

Just swe^r Mr. Mills,

(won't be necessary for you to raise your hands.
[WITNESS SWORN BY THE CLERK IN OPEN COURT]
DAVID L. MILLS, called and su/orn at the instance of
defendant, himself, testified as follows:
DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. JEFFERY:
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

II

0

Mr. Mills, would you please stats your name.

A

David L. Mills.

Q

How old are you?

A

21.

Q

And where do you live, David?

A

In the Central Utah Correctional Facility.

Q

And you're a prisoner of the facility?

A

Yes.

Q

Do you have a parole date?

A

No.

Q

How long do you expect to be in prison, David?

A

A long time.

Q

More than five years?

A

Yes.

PAGE 5
1
2

1

0

Okay.

On March 21st, do you recall March 21st.

the day we were supposed to go to trial?
THE COURT:

3

Counsel, are you just gonna go back

4

and lay a record of what actually happened by the record,

5

because I was there.

6

record would show all this.

7

MR. GLEAVE:

8

THE COURT:

9
10

13

Let's go into something that the

today and—
MR. GLEAVE:
2

0

Um-hm.

On March 21st you were presented with a plea

bargain, which was conveyed to you by me; is that correct?
WITNESS:

14
15

No, Your Honor.

record doesn't show, because Tfve got a lot of things to do

11
12

It's all shown by the minutes. The

3

16

A

Yes.

Q

What was that, plea bargain?

A

That I was to agree to plead guilty to an

17

amended—to amended charges that two felonies would be

18

dismissed.

19
20

4

Q

Was there anything else concerning a plea

bargain, whether you could accept that individually?
A

21

I had to—I couldn't—if I had—if I didn't want

22

to take it, then my co-defendants couldn't take it either.

23

We had to accept it as a group.

24
25

5

Q

bargain?

Were your co-defendants offered the same plea

rnvjc

1

2

1

3
4

2

5

u

A

I was t o l d , yeah, y e s .

Q

Were you willing to accept that plea bargain?

A

No.

Q

Describe why you eventually accepted it?

A

Well, it began with, you know, I was told that

Not at first T wasn't, no.

6

members of the—well, it started with the jury selection

7

[with a lot of the members of the jury and their relations to

8

officers that I had come in contact with in the prison and

9

knowing that these people—I didn't feel that I would get a

10

fair jury trial because they wouldn't be impartial with me

11

having contact with their spouses or brothers or whatever,

12

whatever relation they were to them, and just the pressure

13

from the Court attorney making—saying that we all had to

14

take it at one thing and me with the possibility of

15

retaliation from other inmates if I decided not to take it.

16

I also had—I was also told that members of the jury were

17

prejudiced against me and I just really didn't—I didn't

18

feel that I would get a fair trial.

19

coerced into accepting it.

20
21

3

24
25

Who told you that members of the jury were

prejudiced against you?

22
23

Q

I was pressurred and

4

A

Mr. Neeley.

Q

What did Mr. Neeley say?

A

He told m e — t o put it plainly, he told me that

members of the jury that he knew personally would just as

PAGE 7
1

soon hang me as look at me.

2

so I there was no way of me striking them from the jury

3

selection.

4
5

1

8

A

2

3

11
12
13
14
15
16
17

Because of the—I feared retaliation from other

sources, so I just, you know, I —

9
10

Why did you eventually decide to accept the plea

bargain?

6
7

Q

And I don't knou/ who they were,

Q

Did you attempt to plead no contest?

A

Yes.

Q

What happened?

A

I was told that it wasnft acceptable, that I

couldn't.
4

Q

Do you recall—well, what were your feelings

about being tried with your co-defendants?
A

I was against it from the start
MR. BLACKHAM:

I object to what his feelings were

about that, Your Honor.

18

THE COURT:

19

WITNESS:

20

THE COURT:

21

MR. GLEAVE:

The objection is sustained.
A

Well, I believe it w a s —

The objection is sustained.
Q

Okay.

When you entered

22

your plea, do you remember the Judge asking you if your plea

23

was voluntary?

24

WITNESS:

25

could have said it.

A

No.

I don't remember.

I don't remember him, though.

But he

PAGE 8
1

Q

Okay.

How would your co-defendants have known

you rejected the plea?
A

When u/e went back out, if I would have said no,

it would have been obvious. When we went back out to plea,
if I would have said no, you know, they would have been
standing right there.
2

3

They would have known when I said no.

Q

They would have heard you?

A

Yeah.

Q

Why didn't you tell the Judge your feeling it was

involuntarily?
A

We were all sitting right there.

just like it is right now.

Everybody was

I mean if I would have said

that, it would have been just the same as me saying no
anyway.
4

0

Your impression of the plea, did you benefit from

accepting the plea?

5

A

No.

No.

I don't feel that I did.

Q

Will you get out of prison any earlier, in your

opinion?
A

No. Without question.
MR. GLEAVE:

No more, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Blackham?
CROSS EXAMINATION
BY MR. BLACKHAM:
6

Q

Mr. Mills, did you tell your lawyer, Mr. Gleave

PAGE 9
1

at the time, to express ever—during the morning proceedings

2

down there, did you ever ask your lawyer to express these

3

concerns to the prosecutor?
A

4

I told—I told him that I wanted to plead no

5

contest, because of the—yeah, yeah.

6

because it wasn't—I wasn't—I didn't want to plead guilty.

7

But knowing that—

8
9

1

Q

Did you express these concerns that you've just
testified about to your lawyer that morning?

12
13
14

2

A

Yeah.

Q

Did you tell him—did you tell him that you had

been threatened or put in fear of retaliation in any manner?

15
16

You're kind of getting away from

my question.

10
11

Wait a minute.

Yes, I told him this,

3

A

No.

Q

As a matter of fact, it was Mr. Land and Mr.

17

Eaton who were in the proceedings with you that morning;

18

correct?

19
20
21

4

24
25

Yes.

Q

And isn't it true, Mr. Miles, that in fact,

neither one of those guys ever threatened you that morning?

22
23

A

5

A

No.

Q

They did not threaten you; correct?

A

Not in the way.

trying to say.

Well, it depends on what you're

I don't think I understand what you are

PAGE 10
trial to say.
1

Q

Let me clarify.

A

They didn't say—no—"\l'e are gonna get you."

No.

they didn't say that.
2

Q

Okay.

That's what I'm asking.

Thank you.

Did you ever express to the prosecutor or to the
Judge that you u/ere under some fear or that you had been
threatened in any way by anybody that morning?
A

No.
MR. BLACKHAM:
THE COURT:
MR. GLEAVE:

That's all, Your Honor.

Anything else, Mr. Gleave?
One further question Your Honor.

REDIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. GLEAVE:
3

Q

What—why did you feel that there would be

retaliation, if you rejected the plea?
A

Because I knew.

It's not like something that has

to be told out to you. you know, in those exact words.
just it's like an unsaid thing.

It's

You just—just you know.

You just know.
4

Q

And you knew that if you rejected that plea that

there would b e —
A

Yeah.

See, there was talk about it.

But not in

me exactly, but just whoever didn't go along with it; do you
know what I mean?

PAGE 11
So that's why—okay.

1
2

threaten me?
No.

3
4

So if I was to say did they

Not me, as in saying David Mills.

in a general way it's just whoever didn't go along with it.

5

MR. BLACKHAM:

6

THE COURT:

7

MR. GLEAVE:

6

THE COURT:

All right.

9

THE COURT:

Will you swear Mr. Eaton.

10

But it's

No questions, Your Honor.

Call your next witness.
Jeffery Eaton.

You don't

have to raise your hand, Mr. Eaton.
[WITNESS SWORN BY THE CLERK IN OPEN COURT]

11
12

JEFFERY EATON, called and sworn at the instance of

13

defendant, testified as follows:
DIRECT EXAMINATION

14

BY MR. GLEAVE:

15
16

1

17

Q

Jeff, where do you live?

A

Central Utah Correctional Facility.
MR. GLEAVE:

18
19
20

just a couple of direct questions to set the background.
2

Q

23
24
25

When was your parole date?
WITNESS:

21
22

Your Honor, I feel it's necessary

A

I was scheduled to parole

August 10th, 1993.
3

Q

On March 21stf if you accepted the plea bargain,

when did you feel that you would be released from prison?
A

Anywhere from August of '94 to possibly

PAGE 12
1
2

January/February of '95.
1

3
4
5

Q

What charges u/ere you going to be tried on?

A

A second degree felony of possession of a u/eapon

and third degree felony of rioting.
2

Q

And if you had proceeded u/ith trial and been

6

found guilty, when did you expect to be released from prison

7

on those charges?

8
9
10

3

Five to eight years from now.

Q

Was it in your interest to accept the plea

bargain?

11
12

A

4

A

Yes.

Q

Did you understand the plea bargain that if the

13

co-defendants didn't accept it, you would not be able to

14

accept it?
A

15

Yes.
MR. GLEAVE:

16

CROSS EXAMINATION

17

BY MR. BLACKHAM:

18
19

No further questions.

5

Q

Mr. Eaton, Mr. Mills says that you never directly

20

threatened him or threatened him with bodily injury,

21

retaliation in any manner; is that correct?

22

A

Yes.

23

MR. BLACKHAM:

24

THE COURT:

25

MR. BLACKHAM:

Thank you.

Anything else?
No, Your Honor.
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THE COURT:

1

REDIRECT EXAMINATION

2

BY MR. GLEAVE:

3
4

1

Q

One other question.
THE COURT:

5
6

Counsel?

Mr. Eaton—

I think you're through with Mr.

Eaton, counsel.

7

MR. GLEAVE: Okay.

8

THE COURT: Well, go ahead.

9

MR. GLEAVE:

10

Q

Ask your question.

To threaten someone in

prison does a person have to verbally threaten them?
A

11

No.

There's unsaid rules in a prison

12

environment.

There's lust things that don't even need to be

13

said, but things that all prisoners knou/ automatically.

14

MR. GLEAVE:

That's all.

15

MR. BLACKHAM:

16

THE COURT:

17

MR. GLEAVE: Michael Land.

18

THE COURT: Will you please su/ear Mr. Land.

19

lu/itness sworn by the clerk in open court]

No further questions. Your Honor.

Call your next u/itness.

20

MICHAEL LAND, called and sworn at the instance of

21

defendant, testified as follou/s:
DIRECT EXAMINATION

22

BY MR. GLEAVE:

23
24
25

2

Q

Now, Michael, where do you live?

A

Urn, I'm now housed in Draper, Utah, Unit 2.
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1

Q

Did you have a parole date?

A

Yes.

I was supposed to be released on August the

10th, 1993.
2

Q

Did you feel it was in your best interest to

accept a plea bargain?
A

Ah, not at first.

against it.

We was all three of us was

Most of us—most of us inmates were against

taking a plea bargain and it was to our best interest to
stick together.

It was to our best interest to stick

together, you know, for a lot of inmates were pressurred
into sticking together, you know, because it was just pure
pressure.

But when it came down to it and they offered to

plea bargain, I think Mr. Mills was pressurred into it
because he wanted to—me and him didn't want to at all.
didn't want to accept a plea bargain.

We

But Mr. Eaton here,

he had a different opinion, you know, so we figured well, if
ue all go to trial, then we're all gonna be found guilty.
After we looked at—after we went to the roster sheet and we
realized that everybody was mostly related we felt this
community would be prejudiced towards us.
3

Q

Okay.

If you had gone to trial and been found

guilty, when did you expect to be released from prison?

4

A

Anywhere from 5 to 10 years from now.

Q

If you accepted the plea bargain, when did you

expect to be released?
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A

1
2
3

Anywhere from August '94 to December

February '95.
1

4

Q

Considerably short period of time?

A

A short period of time.
MR. GLEAVE:

5

That's all, Your Honor.

CROSS EXAMINATION

6

BY MR. BLACKHAM:

7
8

'94—or

2

Q

Mr. Land, Mr. Mills said that you never directly

9

threatened him or threatened retaliation against him in

10

order to get this plea from him; is that also correct?

11
12

3

A

No.

I did not.

Q

No.

Wait.

15

Just ansu/er.

You did not directly threaten him; is that

13
14

But like I said,—

correct?
A

No.

T d i d not.

16

MR. BLACKHAM:

17

MR. GLEAVE:

18

THE COURT:

19

MR. BLACKHAM:

That's all.
No further witnesses, Your Honor.

Anything else. Mr. Blackham?
No, Your Honor.

I intend to ask

20

the Court to make a finding, as to the proceedings that day,

21

and I know the Court doesn't want to go through that, but as

22

long as that' s —

23

THE COURT:

24

MR. BLACKHAM:

25

I don't want to go through what?
I think it's important that the

record reflect, Your Honor, that the Court went through
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questions in proceedings that day and I don't know whether
you can find that without further testimony about it or not.
I gather, from the comments by Mr. Gleave, that you were
aware of the proceedings that you conducted them-

But I

don't intend to call witnesses on any of the other issues.
THE COURT:

So you rest?

MR. BLACKHAM:
THE COURT:
MR. GLEAVE:

Yes.

You rest?
One other item. Your Honor.

At this

time we do not wish to address a strict compliance
requirements with the Rule 11 of the UTAH RULES OF
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE.

However, we would like to reserve that

procedure, if this ruling is is adverse to us today.
THE COURT:
you're talking about.

Adverse what issue?

Tell me what

Get specific.

You claim I didn't comply with Rule 11?
MR. GLEAVE:

I don't want to claim that right

now, but I would like to reserve that, Your Honor.
THE COURT:

Well, you were present.

Didn't I ask

you at one time if there was any reason why I should not
sentence them?
MR. GLEAVE:
THE COURT:

Yes, you did, Your Honor.
You told me there was no reason;

isn't that what you told me?
MR. GLEAVE:

Yes, I believe I did.
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THE COURT:

1
2

that.
MR. GLEAVE:

3
4

Now you d o n ' t u/ant t o be bound by

No.

I d o n ' t u/ant t o be bound by

whether—

5

THE COURT:

All right.

Anything else?

6

MR. GLEAVE:

7

THE COURT:

8

Do you want to argue the matter?

9

MR. BLACKHAM:

No.
All right.

I submit it, Your Honor. I

10

believe there's been compliance with Rule 11.

11

believe there's anything you've heard today to present

12

evidence of threats, retaliation, promises in any manner to

13

invalidate the plea.
COURT ORDER AND FINDINGS

14

THE COURT:

15
16

denied.

17

plea to be withdrawn.

18

I don't

The motion to withdraw the plea is

I don't see any than reason that I should allow the

I advised them of their constitutional rights.

19

In my opinion that was voluntarily and the record should

20

indicate that I sat down there and waited with a jury

21

paneled, ready to go, for nearly four or five hours while in

22

this matter they went over and advised all the rights. I

23

think this is just a dilatory procedure for the purpose of

24

causing the Court problems and taking the public's time.

25

The motion is denied.

FAUb 10

Thank you.
MR. GLEAVE: Okay.
[WHEREUPON THE ABOVE ENTITLED PROCEEDINGS WERE
COMPLETED]
—ooOoo—
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1
2
3
4
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6
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7
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8

stenographic notes; that the foregoing pages, numbered 1 -

9
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10
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11
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12
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13
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STATE OF UTAH

ADDENDUM C

ROSS C. BLACKHAM (#0357)
Sanpete County Attorney
Sanpete County Courthouse
160 North Main
Manti, Utah 84642
Telephone: (801) 835-6381

X'o#V&\

IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SANPETE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

1

vs.

ORDER DENYING DAVID MILL'S
MOTIOK TO WITHDRAW
I
GUILTY PLEA
Case No. 931600154
Judge Don V. Tibbs

DAVID L. MILLS,
Defendant.

The above case having come before the Court on May 4, 1994 on
Defendant

David

Mill's

Motion

to

Withdraw

his

Guilty

Plea.

Defendant was personally present and represented by his attorney
Jeffery P. Gleave.

The State was represented by Ross C. Blackham,

Sanpete County Attorney.

The Court having heard testimony from

witnesses now enters the following findings and orders
1)

That on March 21, 1994, the Defendant David L. Mills

appeared before the Court and entered a guilty plea to Attempted
Riot, a Class A Misdemeanor and Attempt to Injure a Jail, a Class
A Misdemeanor.
2)

That Defendant, at the time, was personally present and

represented by his attorney Jeffery P. Gleave.

-2-

3) That prior to the entry of the plea that the Defendant and
his attorney had an excess of 2 hours to discuss a plea bargain
with the State in the case.
4)

That at the time of accepting the plea the Court, on the

record, and in the presence
advised him

of the Defendant

and his

attorney

of his rights under Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of

Criminal Procedure and specifically asked the Defendant and his
attorney if there was any reason why he should not accept a plea.
Defendants counsel and Defendant affirmatively stated that there
was no reason.
5) That the Court finds that

there were not any threats made

to the Defendant from co-defendants in this case in order to obtain
his plea.
6)

From the foregoing findings the Court fails to find good

cause for the Motion to Withdraw Defendant's Guilty Plea and the
Motion is hereby denied.
DATED this

ft)

dav of May, 1994.
BY THE COURTi

tA

2!

K.

&

> I DON V. TIBBS
JUDGE
I DISTRICT COURT
COU

I
/

/

,

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I have nailed a true and correct copy
of the above and foregoing instrunent to the Defendant's attorney,
Jeffery P. Gleave at HUNT AND GLEAVE 195 North 100 East, Suite
205, Richfield, Utah 84"3l, postage prepaid this // dav of April,,
1994.
^
A\*p

fll/f.

( jO\Crf*tft1\
<
a£d

Secretary

ADDENDUM D

Utah R. Crim. Pro. 11(e)
The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, . . . and may
not accept the plea until the court has found:
(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he
or she has knowingly waived the right to counsel and does not
desire counsel;
(2) the plea is voluntarily made;
(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption
of innocence, the right against compulsory self-incrimination,
the right to a speedy public trial before an impartial jury, the
right to confront and cross-examine in open court the prosecution
witnesses, the right to compel the attendance of defense
witnesses, and that by entering the plea, these rights are
waived;
(4) the defendant understands the nature and elements
of the offense to which the plea is entered, that upon trial the
prosecution would have the burden of proving each of those
elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the plea is an
admission of all those elements;
(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum
sentence, and if applicable, the minimum mandatory nature of the
minimum sentence, that may be imposed for each offense to which a
plea is entered, including the possibility of the imposition of
consecutive sentences;
(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea
discussion and plea agreement, and if so, what agreement has been
reached;
(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits
for filing any motion to withdraw the plea; and
(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of
appeal is limited.
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